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Abstract—We review threats and selected schemes concerning
hardware security at design and manufacturing time as well as
at runtime. We find that 3D integration can serve well to enhance
the resilience of different hardware security schemes, but it also
requires thoughtful use of the options provided by the umbrella
term of 3D integration. Toward enforcing security at runtime, we
envision secure 2.5D system-level integration of untrusted chips
and “all around” shielding for 3D ICs.
Index Terms—Hardware Security, 3D Integration
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the fact that integrated circuits (ICs) are at the heart of
ubiquitous information technology, IC designers and vendors
should seek to establish trust into their products by all available
means. However, doing so is a practical challenge as related
efforts deviate from the typically security-unaware design and
manufacturing flows. For example, it has been shown that
the speculative execution in processors, which is an industry-
wide best practice, can be exploited to leak sensitive data [1].
Besides such concerns regarding data at runtime, the field of
hardware security also spans other design- and manufacturing-
time threats such as reverse engineering (RE), intellectual
property (IP) piracy, overproduction, or insertion of hardware
Trojans (HTs) [2]. The latter threats arise due to outsourcing,
which is a predominant trend for IC supply chains, as it is the
case for many other industries nowadays.
Aside from traditional 2D IC manufacturing, research and
development for 3D integration has made significant progress
over recent years. 3D integration means to stack and inter-
connect multiple chips or active layers. There are two main
drivers for 3D integration [3], [4]: (1) the CMOS scalability
bottleneck, which becomes more exacerbated for advanced
nodes by issues like routability, pitch scaling, and process
variations; and (2) the need to advance means for hetero-
geneous and system-level integration. Both drivers are also
known as (1) “More Moore” and (2) “More than Moore.”
Various studies, prototypes, and commercial products have
shown that 3D integration can indeed offer significant benefits
over conventional 2D ICs, e.g., see [5], [6], [7], [8].
The umbrella term of 3D integration comprises four differ-
ent flavors as follows (Fig. 1):
(a) Through-silicon via (TSV) 3D ICs, where multiple chips
are fabricated separately and then stacked and bonded.
The vertical interconnects across the 3D ICs are realized
by relatively large metal TSVs which are cutting through
the individual chips.
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Fig. 1. Four flavors of 3D integration. Metal layers are colored in green, active
layers in brown, along with logic in blue, and bonding layers in yellow.
(b) Face-to-face (F2F) 3D ICs, where two chips are fabri-
cated separately and then bonded directly at their back-
end-of-line (BEOL) metal “faces.” TSVs or wirebonds
are commonly used for external connections.
(c) Monolithic 3D (M3D) ICs, where multiple active layers
are manufactured sequentially. The vertical interconnects
are implemented by regular metal vias.
(d) 2.5D ICs, where chips are fabricated separately and then
stacked and bonded onto a system-level interconnect
carrier, the so-called interposer. This interposer can be
either passive, comprising only metal layers and possibly
some discrete devices, or active, containing some logic.
In this paper, we discuss prior art concerning hardware
security in general. We then elaborate how 3D integration
offers unique opportunities to advance such schemes, along
with a review of recent studies.
II. PROTECTION OF DESIGN IP
Independent of 2D IC manufacturing or modern 3D in-
tegration, various techniques have been proposed over the
years toward protection of chip design IP. Most works fall
under one of the following three categories: logic locking
(LL), layout camouflaging (LC), or split manufacturing (SM).
All three schemes consider different threats; LL is concerned
about untrusted end-users and malicious foundries, SM about
untrusted foundries, and LC about untrusted end-users. The
interested reader may also want to see [9] for more details.
Now, 3D integration can serve to advance these schemes in
different ways. The main benefit provided by 3D integration
is the physical separation of components, as dictated by
the security-enforcing designer and/or vendor, be it across
interconnects, active devices, or both. In Table I, we provide
an overview on selected works, which are also discussed next.
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TABLE I
SELECTED 3D SCHEMES TARGETING AT MANUFACTURING TIME
Reference Style Scheme Scope Assets Trusted Facility
[10] 2.5D SM IP Piracy Wires BEOL
[11] 2.5D SM HT Prevent. Wires BEOL
[12] F2F SM & LC IP Piracy Gates & Wires FEOL & BEOL
[13] M3D LC IP Piracy Gates FEOL
[14] F2F SM & LC IP Piracy Gates & Wires BEOL
A. Logic Locking
To the best of our knowledge, 3D integration has not been
explored yet for LL. In a loosely related work by Sengupta et
al. [15], the authors leverage formal principles pertaining to
LL in order to advance the notion of SM. More specifically,
they lock the FEOL and delegate the unlocking to a separate,
trusted BEOL facility, namely by implementing the LL key
via BEOL-level routing toward fixed-logic drivers. The authors
note that their scheme can also be realized at the package or
board level, which suggests an implementation as 2.5D IC.
B. Camouflaging
Yan et al. [13] were first to propose LC dedicated for
3D integration, more specifically for monolithic 3D ICs. The
authors developed and characterized custom libraries, and
they evaluated their scheme at both the cell and the chip
scale. The device-level camouflaging is realized by dummy
contacts, which has been proposed already previously for LC
in classical 2D ICs. Thus, while conceptionally not new, the
work in [13] leverages the benefits provided by monolithic
3D ICs, in an effort to advance the scalability of LC. That
is noteworthy because prior art for 2D-centric LC may incur
excessive PPA cost. For example, the 2D NAND-NOR-XOR
primitive of [16] would incur 5.5× power, 1.6× delay, and
4× area cost compared to a regular NAND gate.1 In contrast,
Yan et al. [13] report on average 25% power cost, 15% delay
cost, and 43% area savings compared to regular 2D gates.
C. Split Manufacturing
As indicated by the terminology, SM means to split the
manufacturing flow, typically into an untrusted FEOL process
and a trusted BEOL process thereafter. For the FEOL facility,
a split layout appears like a “sea of gates,” making it difficult
to infer the complete netlist readily. Still, since physical-design
tools work holistically on both FEOL and BEOL, various
traces can well remain in the FEOL [19], [20].
To advance SM, leveraging 3D integration is straightforward
and also promising. That is because 3D integration allows
to split a design into multiple chips, which can maintain
their FEOL and BEOL layers independently, whereas the
2.5D/3D stack can comprise further parts of the system-level
interconnects. This system-level nature of 3D SM allows to
manufacture, test, and withhold various functional components
from untrusted parties, all as need be. Moreover, concerns
regarding the practicability of classical 2D SM can be elevated
1The excessive cost of 2D LC schemes would arguably allow only for few
gates being camouflaged. This, in turn, renders prior art either fully prone to
analytical attacks, e.g., see the Boolean satisfiability (SAT) framework in [17],
or it calls for advanced, SAT-resilient schemes. By nature, however, such
schemes are low-corruptibility ones, thereby enabling an attacker to obtain at
least an approximate version of the IP [18].
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Fig. 2. Key concepts for 3D split manufacturing with camouflaging, as
proposed in [14]. (a) Obfuscated interconnects are added to render RE more
difficult. (b) Randomized routing to hinder FEOL-foundry-based adversaries
from inferring the netlist. For simplicity, only the bottom chip and the
additional, trusted BEOL interconnects are indicated.
due to this very fact that the 2.5D/3D stack can hold additional
system-level interconnects independently of the regular FEOL
and BEOL processing of individual chips.
The idea of 3D SM was outlined already in 2008, by
Tezzaron Semiconductor Corp. [21]. Various early studies
were hinting at 3D SM as well, but most had some limitations.
For example, Dofe et al. [22] remained on the conceptional
level. Xie et al. [10] and Imeson et al. [11] utilized 2.5D
integration with “only” wires being hidden from untrusted
facilities—in principle, this is equivalent to traditional SM
for 2D ICs but, as indicated, it is more practical. Still, the
studies [10], [11] suffer from considerable layout cost.
Later on, DeVale et al. [23], Gu et al. [12], and Patnaik
et al. [14] explored SM in the context of 3D ICs, effectively
promoting “native 3D SM.” One key findings of those later
studies is that both the partitioning as well as the design of
the vertical interconnects play an important role and define a
cost-security trade-off as follows. The more the design is split
across multiple chips, the higher the layout cost can become
(also due to the need for more vertical interconnects), but the
more flexibility an security-enforcing designer has to separate
components and thereby “dissolve” the IP across the 3D stack.
D. Split Manufacturing and Camouflaging in Conjunction
Both Gu et al. [12] and Patnaik et al. [14] proposed 3D
SM in conjunction with LC. While Gu et al. [12] consider
regular, FEOL-centric LC, Patnaik et al. [14] argue that
another approach is more appropriate, namely the obfuscation
of the vertical interconnects.
In their work [14], the authors propose to include additional
metal layers as redistribution layers (RDLs) between the chips
of an F2F 3D IC. As illustrated in Fig. 2, these additional
layers comprise (a) obfuscated interconnects (without loss
of generality using magnesium- and magnesium-oxide-based
vias) to render RE of the 3D IC more difficult, and (b) random-
ized routing paths such that regular stacking of the chips will
not readily reveal these missing interconnects. By doing so,
their work addresses both malicious foundries and end-users,
along with affordable layout and manufacturing cost [14].
Besides LC along with 3D SM as outlined above, other
works suggest camouflaging at the system level. More specif-
ically, Dofe et al. [24] propose to obfuscate the vertical
communication links in 3D ICs by rerouting within dedicated
network-on-chip structures (NoCs) “sandwiched” between the
chips. In that sense, their idea is similar but more flexible to
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Fig. 3. Our concept for a secure 2.5D system-level integration of untrusted
chips. All communication between chips and memories are monitored by the
security features residing in the active, security-enforcing interposer.
the randomized routing outlined above for Patnaik et al. [14],
although it is also more costly as it requires dedicated active
layers instead of only metal layers.
III. HARDWARE SECURITY AT RUNTIME
Aside from the need for protecting the design IP and
rendering the globalized supply chain more trustworthy, there
are also various security risks arising at runtime. The major
threats are (i) unauthorized access or modification of data and
(ii) invasive probing or modification of the hardware or its
behavior. For (i), this can occur via malicious software, HTs,
side-channel attacks, misuse of test infrastructures, etc. For
(ii), this comprises scenarios like focused-ion beam milling,
monitoring of photon emission, fault injection, etc.
Similar to the case of IP protection, 3D integration can also
advance schemes focused on security at runtime, again by the
virtue of physical separation. Next, we provide an overview
on selected works, and we also propose some novel concepts.
A. Monitoring or Verification of Untrusted ICs
In general, various monitoring or verification schemes have
been proposed toward continuous control of ICs, e.g., see [25],
[26], [27], [28]. The common objective of these works is
to detect any malicious or unexpected behaviour at runtime,
emanating from software, hardware, or even both.
Extending such schemes via 3D integration is particularly
promising. That is because the security-critical components
can be implemented separately using a trusted fabrication
process and 3D-integrated later on with the commodity chip to
be monitored [28], [29], [30]. Still, we caution that the physical
implementation can become a vulnerability by itself. In [30],
for example, the authors propose “introspective interfaces”
which, however, require additional logic within the commodity
chip to be monitored. It is easy to see that these interfaces
could fail when they are modified by any malicious actor
involved with the design or manufacturing of that commodity
chip. Thus, a undesirable dependency arises, possibly thwart-
ing the scheme altogether. We note that the authors themselves
acknowledge this limitation for their work in [30].
Here we envision an alternative for secure monitoring at
runtime, based on 2.5D integration (Fig. 3). The essence of
our approach is to provide a proper, system-level separation
of untrusted commodity and trusted security components.
That is, all the physical interfaces and security features are
delegated exclusively to an active interposer, which also serves
as system-level interconnect backbone and integration carrier.
Active interposer have been successful demonstrated, e.g.,
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Fig. 4. Our proposal for “all around” shielding in 3D ICs. The most suitable
integration style is back-to-back (B2B) stacking, since it allows to protect the
substrate backsides from invasive probing and non-invasive readout attacks.
The frontsides comprise dedicated layers/routing paths for the shield (light
green), which are complemented by shield TSVs (dark red) placed at the IC
boundaries. The shield logic is integrated along with regular logic.
see [31]; they can also be implemented using an old but trusted
facility, thereby possibly allowing for cost savings.
B. Probing, Monitoring, or Circuit Modification Attacks
Semi- or fully-invasive probing, monitoring, fault injection,
or even circuit modifications are arguably the most severe
threats for hardware security at runtime. Related attacks and
various countermeasures have been demonstrated for classical
2D ICs, e.g., see [32], [33], [34] and [35], [36], [37], [38].
Despite the severity of those threats on the one hand, we
also emphasize that, on the other hand, the benefits which
3D integration can offer to protect against such threats are
outstanding. To the best of our knowledge, 3D integration is
the only enabler for an “all around” shield approach. That is,
only within 3D ICs we can build up a fully enveloping 3D
shield structure (Fig. 4). Such a 3D shield would comprise
(i) dedicated metal layers/wires building up individual shields
for both the chips, and (ii) TSVs to interconnect the shields
of the two chips. Toward the logical and physical design of
the individual shields, prior art can be leveraged readily, e.g.,
see [36], [38]. Besides hindering probing attacks, we believe
that such a 3D shield could also hinder other non-invasive but
powerful attacks, e.g., monitoring of the photon emission [33].
Similar protection has been discussed before in [35], [36].
However, the true potential for 3D shields has not been
explored yet; the authors of those early studies considered
techniques like B2B stacking either as out-of-scope or as im-
practical, although without providing any substantiated critic.
C. Side-Channel Attacks and Hardware Trojans
Conducting a side-channel attack (SCA) means to carefully
examine the physical emanations of an IC under attack, in
order to extract some sensitive information. SCAs are powerful
and hard to prevent since any electronic device is inevitably
subject to physical side-channels emissions at runtime. For
example, it has been shown that the timing of caches or power
consumption can be exploited to infer secret keys [39].
On the one hand, prior art considers SCAs which are
targeted explicitly for 3D ICs. For example, Gu et al. [40]
and Knechtel and Sinanoglu [41] seek to hinder thermal SCAs
on 3D ICs at runtime and design time, respectively, whereas
Dofe et al. [42] seek to hinder power SCAs on 3D ICs. On
the other hand, some studies leverage the benefits provided
by 3D integration to apply security techniques otherwise
considered too costly. For example, Bao and Srivastava [43]
impose random eviction and differing latencies across a cache
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architecture. The authors show that such techniques incur high
performance cost in classical 2D ICs but can be realized even
with some performance gains in a 3D IC.
Mossa et al. [44] have cautioned that HTs can become more
stealthy and effectively tailored for 3D ICs than for 2D ICs.
The authors explore thermal triggers in detail, motivated by
the fact that thermal management is a well-known challenge
for 3D ICs by itself. Finally, in a similar but general manner,
we like to caution that the broader landscape of suppliers
and actors involved with 3D integration can open up new
opportunities for attackers to embed different types of HTs.
IV. SUMMARY
In this short paper, we have reviewed major threats
and selected schemes concerning hardware security at de-
sign/manufacturing time as well as at runtime. We note that
3D integration serves well to enhance different approaches
for hardware security, but it also requires careful use of those
novel 3D techniques. We have also outlined two advanced
schemes for enforcing security at runtime, one based on 2.5D
system-level integration of untrusted commodity chips, and
one based on “all around” 3D shielding.
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